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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of employment and compensation practices
under alternative institutions of municipal government which
demonstrates that institutional variations have significant, important.
and predictable effects upon outcomes in municipal labor markets.
Municipal inetitutions in which a single official is responsible for
office performance provide that official with incentives to emphasize
efficiency in the production of municipal services. Institutions in
which responsibility is shared provide individual officials with incen-
tives to emphasize the allocation of municipal resources to their par-
ticular constituencies, among whom municipal employees may be prominent.
Independently, city managers and mayors chosen through direct elec-
tion reduce levels of employment and increase employee compensation.
Managers offer compensation packages which emphasize nonwage components.
In cities which have both institutions, competition between the two
nullifies employment reductions and exacerbates compensation increases.
Employment increases with the age of the manager's office.
City councilmembers chosen through at-large or nonpartisan elections
increase levels of both employment and compensation. Compensation
packages under both emphasize current components. With both reforms,
employment and compensation increases are compounded.
Jeffrey S. Zax
N.B.E.R.
269 Mercer Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10003The institutions within which economic activity is conducted appear only
infrequently in economic analysis. For most purposes, economists take
institutions to be artifacts of more fundamental behavioral characteris-
tics. They assume that economic agents understand their own resources
and objectives, and those of agents with whom they interact. In concert,
these agents simply orgarzize institutions within which resources and
objectives can be most conveniently reconciled. Any array of resources
and objectives automatically implies a particular institution. For
analytical purposes, knowledge of institutions is redundant if resources
and objectives are themselves known.
These assumptions are probably appropriate in markets where informa-
tion is readily available, where institutions are readily malleable and
where power is readily appropriable. However, in markets where relevant
information is dear, institutions are protected by custom or higher
sanction, and power can be closely held, institutional structure can
exert substantial independent influence on market outcomes. For example,
markets in which institutions of government play large roles are un-
deniably sensitive to those institutions.
The importance of institutions, and of government institutions in
particular, has not escaped attention. For example, political science
offers a sophisticated theory of the economic behavior characteristic to
different municipal government institutions. Some empirical studies of
local public labor markets have, independently of political theory,
recognized one source of variation in municipal government structure.
Unfortunately, analysis in th9 general traditions of urban economics andmunicipal public finance has typically been executed without reference
to institutional differences.
This paper presents an analysis of employment and compensation prac-
tices under alternative institutions of municipal government. This
analysis serves two purposes. First, it expands on the two themes from
which it draws: It shares a theme with previous economic work in which
municipal institutions appear, in its examination of local public sector
labor markets. It extends previous analyses of municipal labor markets
by examining levels of employment, and of nonwage compensation com-
ponents, as well as levels of wages. This analysis also shares a theme
with the political theory of municipal government; it evaluates all
important variations in municipal government structure. It extends
previous analyses of municipal government structure with theoretical
reconsiderations and empirical tests.
The second purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the general
proposition that institutions, those of municipal governments as a case
in point, exercise important influence over economic activity. This
influence is often systematic and predictable. The behavior of municipal
officials --whetherelected or appointed --whowish to remain in
office is constrained by the structure of the office they hold arid the
method by which they are selected.
City managers and mayors chosen through direct elections require
broad support from the electorate in order to retain their positions.
They obtain more useful political support from a city population
—2-satisfied with municipal services than from Municipal employees blessed
with patronage. The analysis in this paper demonstrates that these
officials reduce municipal employment levels, but increase employee
compensation. A small work force of skilled, well-paid employees
produces municipal services most efficiently, and serves best their
political ambitions.
Under most electoral systems, city councillors can often gain elec-
tion through the support of small constituencies within the electorate
as a whole. The active support of municipal employees can be a valuable
asset to council candidates to whom the opportunity to court other
interest groups has been denied. The analysis in this paper demonstrates
that city councillors who are elected through nonpartisan ballots or
through city-wide elections increase both levels of municipal employment
and of compensation for municipal employees. Elections held under these
conditions offer limited opportunity to council candidates who wish to
rely upon traditional neighborhood or party loyalties. Councilmembers
instead take advantage of the easy appeal to municipal employees with
whom they have been generous.
The behavior of municipal government institutions changes as they
age. Municipal government institutions of early vintage may embody
older, labor-intensive techniques of production. The analysis in this
paper demonstrates that municipal employment levels are higher in cities
with older, council-manager government forms.
-3-I. ci19!!ent
Government institutions, by their designs, partially insulate government
officials from the citizens whom they nominally represent or serve. For
example, terms in office guaranteed by statutory election schedules or
by civil service regulations are characteristics of public office which
serve the explicit purpose of protecting incumbents from 'inappropriate'
citizen pressure. These and other characteristics of public offices
reduce the sensitivity of government officials to marginal changes in
citizen preferences.
1
Public officials evaluate public reaction to their official perfor-
mances in terms of signals derived from flows of two different political
'currencies'; money --bothgovernment revenues and political contribu-
tions --andvotes. Distributions of these two forms of political
'wealth' by citizen characteristics differ dramatically. They are only
imperfectly substitutable for each other. The concurrence of signals in
these two currencies unavoidably complicates their interpretation.
Changes in distributions of citizen preferences may imply inconsistent
changes in monetary and electoral signals. Changes which give rise to
consistent signals may speak less forcefully than if only one type of
signal were possible. In these conditions, there is no guarantee that
marginal changes in citizen preferences will be expressed so as to be
intelligible to public officials, no matter how public-spirited.
1
"Political power is very much like market power in that it permits
the powerholder to indulge either his brutality or his flaccidity."
(Hirachman, pg. 58).
—4-If public officials recognize marginal changes in citizen
preferences, they may frequently experience little compulsion to ac-
comodate them. Electoral signals may, by their categorical nature, be
muted. Marginal changes in citizen preferences which reduce satisfaction
with an incumbent, but which still leave the incumbent with a majority
over any challenger, may be treated as of little consequence. 2
Public officials also have the ability to resist, or counter, the
effects of monetary signals. They can compel payment of taxes illegally
withheld. They can request transfers from higher levels of government to
replace revenues lost through migration of dissatisfied citizens. They
can solicit additional funds from 'infra-marginal' citizens, those whose
current tax payments are exceeded by the value they place on government
services.
For all these reasons, government offers no guarantee that the
relationship between citizen preferences and government behavior will be
invariant to the specific institutions of government. Marginal changes
in citizen preferences may not be recognized by public officials. If
they are recognized, public officials may still be free to avoid chang-
ing public policy in exact measure with changes in citizen tastes. They
will use this freedom to pursue their own objectives, within the oppor-
tunities available through their offices. The policies they pursue will,
2
Migration as a signal —- 'votingwith the feet' --entailsa similar
problem. Migration is usually a categorical, discrete decision br
the migrant. Dissatisfaction with public services which leaves
present jurisdiction preferable to all others may also be safely
ignored.
-5-therefore, depend upon the alternatives defined by the specific institu-
tions of which they are a part.
Municipal governments in the United States present an ideal context
in which to observe the extent of this dependency. They embody many
different combinations of municipal institutions. These combinations
very significantly in the off ices to which they allocate executive,
legislative and administrative responsibilities. Municipal government
behavior should vary systematically with changes in the array of in-
stitutions which comprise a municipality, if government structure exerts
independent influence over its actions.
Labor economists, in the explication of other issues, have produced
some incidental evidence of systematic variations in municipal behavior.
Analyses of municipal compensation practices regularly consider the
relationship between compensation levels and methods of city administra-
tion. Ehrenberg/Goldstein find higher wages'irl cities administered by
city managers for employees in six of ten municipal functions.
Edwards/Edwards report that compensation levels for municipal sanitation
workers are higher under city managers. Ehrenberg and Ichniowski report
similar results for fire fighters.
These issues have been ignored in the empirical literatures of urban
economics and of local public finance. "Models ...aresupposed to
be useful for appraising the impacts of government policies, but
governments as decision-making bodies are absent.'
(Goldstein/Moses). In a more recent example, "No consideration of
public decision making will be attempted here." (Bucovetsky).
City managers are professional administrators, appointed by elected
municipal officials to supervise the execution of sunicipal policy.These articles agree on three counts. Without exception, they choose
the presence or absence of city managers as the one characteristic of
municipal government structure which has important consequences for
municipal behavior. Second, they conclude that city employees obtain
higher levels of compensation under city managers. Third, they offer no
explanation for the prominence they confer upon city managers, and
little justification for the effects they estimate.
Edwards/Edwards are more concerned than are the other authors to
provide some insight into the influence of city managers. They suggest
that city managers offer higher salaries to their employees because they
have professional commitments to standards of 'fairness' in compensation
--suchas those represented by 'comparability' measures --andbecause
they can enforce sensible work rules. While these notions are helpful,
they do not constitute a theory of city manager behavior. In sum, these
studies demonstrate only that at least one institutional characteristic
of city government appears to have independent effects upon city be-
havior.
The economic literature does not recognize institutional characteris-
tics of city government other than the city managership, and does not
attempt to offer a comprehensive theory of city government behavior.
Political scientists have offered such theories, through explicit con-
sideration of city legislative structure as well as city administrative
institutions. These theories imply that municipal economic behavior will
vary significantly with differences in the structure of municipal
government.
-7-Lineberry/Fowler, recalling the reform movement in municipal
politics, identify the character of city councillor elections and of
city councillor representation, in addition to the presence or absence
of city managers, as important characteristics of city government struc-
ture. Proponents of municipal reform advocated, among other programs,
the institution of city managers, the conduct of nonpartisan council
elections, and election of councilmen at-large.These three elements
of the reform agenda have proven to be most durable. For example,
Baker/Colby, in concurrence with Lineberry/Fowler, define a city as
'reformed' if these three institutions have been adopted. Bryant finds
that of seven initiatives originally stated in the "Model City Charter",
only nonpartisan elections, at-large councilmen and city managers have
achieved oint acceptance among American municipalities.
The goals of the reform movement define the roles that political
scientists expect these institutions to play. Adherents to that movement
advocated them as means to ensure that municipal services were provided
professionally, efficiently, and uniformly (Lineberry/Fowler). The
economic behavior of municipalities which have adopted them should
differ in two dimensions from those which have not, if they fulfill
their mission. Reform city governments should reduce the scope and cost
of the local public sector (Lyons). For example, they should reduce the
size of the municipal labor force (Baker/Colby). At the same time,
reform governments should employ more sophisticated financial strategies
Public affiliations with national political parties are prohibited
in nonpartisan elections, though most such elections permit affilia-
tions with local parties. In at-large elections, all municipal
citizens are entitled to vote for all vacant city council seats.and more sophisticated personnel policies in the execution of wore
sophisticated programs. They should place greater emphasis on the pur-
suit of intergovernmental grants, greeter emphasis on civil service
standards for employment and greater emphasis on urban planning (Cole).
These hypotheses have not elicited satisfactory empirical demonstra-
tions. Political scientists have had difficulty demonstrating that city
managers, councilmen elected in nonpartisan elections and councilmen
elected from at-large districts have any effects, at all, much less that
their effects are consistent with the reformist mission they have been
established to accomplish. Neither Cole nor Norgan/Pelissero discern any
important effects of reform institutions. They claim that empirical
political science routinely rejects the hypothesis that such effects
obtain.
This is an exaggeration. Reform institutions have, in some instances,
revealed reform effects. Tucker reports, in a case study, that a reform
agency is characterized by more professional management then is an
otherwise similar 'traditional' agency. In larger samples,
Lineberry/Fowler and Lyons find that expenditures in reformed cities are
reduced. They also find that taxation is reduced. Baker/Colby identify
reduced levels of employment in cities with reform government institu-
tions. However, reform institutions are also associated with unexpected
effects. Lyons, for example, claims that these cities receive fewer
grants per capita. Clark claims that general expenditures are greater in
reform than in traditional municipalities. This evidence, while incon-
clusive, justifies further exploration of variations in the economic
-9-behavior of municipal institutions.
The analysis presented here departs from thatin the literature of
political science on two counts. It reinterprets the significance of the
three characteristics --citymanagership, councillor representation and
councillor partisanship --whichhave already been considered. It iden-
tifies two important characteristics of city government --themethod of
mayoral election and the age of government institutions --whosein-
fluence has not previously been explored. These departures give rise to
a new characterization of the influence municipal institutions exercise
over municipal economic behavior.
The incentives to which municipal dfficials respond are largely
defined by the functions which their offices are designed to fulfill.
The municipal offices in which executive and administrative authority
resides are held by a single individual who must assume individual
responsibility for the exercise of that authority. The offices in which
legislative authority resides are typically held by many individuals,
who are collectively reponsible for legislative activity. This contrast,
rather than that between reform and traditional regimes, distinguishes
the two important political contexts within which municipal officials
must act.
Independent municipal executive authorities are represented in the
offices of the city manager and of the mayor chosen through direct
-10-elections.6
The individual who holds either of these offices is solely
responsible for the execution of its duties. In either office, that
individual's performance must therefore be acceptable to a large part of
the municipal electorate if his or her tenure is to be extended.
City managers and mayors chosen through direct elections must provide
adequate levels of municipal services throughout their cities, in order
to create a broad constituency. Their executive authority better serves
their political ambitions through the promotion of efficient, impartial
service provision than through the patronage of favored interests. For
example, city managers and mayors chosen through direct elections should
preside over municipal governments in which municipal labor forces are
comprised of relatively few, highly skilled and highly paid employees.
Labor forces in municipalities which lack either of these independent
executive officers are more likely to be swollen with loyal, if un-
productive, constituents of other municipal officials.
This broad characterization, as it applies to the behavior of city
6
Citizens choose among individuals who have declared their candidacy
specifically for the mayoralty, wheie the office is filled through
direct elections. Where the office is filled indirectly, citizens
vote only for city councillora. The mayoralty is assumed by an
elected councillor, chosen, for example, as the candidate
whoattracted the moat votes in the popular election, or as the
victor in a subsequent election held among successful council can-
didates. In these cities, mayoral responsibilities are largely
ceremonial.
City managers hold office by virtue of contracts signed with the
municipality, rather than by virtue of electoral victories. They are
never subject to direct review by the electorate. However, their
appointments are subject to approval by elected city councils. If
they wish to ensure the support of a majority among the council,
their programs must appeal to a wide range of community interests.
—11—managers, is similar to that found in the literature of political
science. As mayors chosen by direct election must build constituencies
of scope analogous to those required by city managers, this charac-
terization is a broad description of their behavior, as well. However,
city managers and mayors chosen by direct election will exercise their
influence over the details of municipal government in different ways.
They must, by the nature of their offices, differ in their attention to
professional and to political considerations.
For example, city managers will principally regard municipal
employees as inputs into production functions for municipal services.
Mayors chosen through direct elections will recognize that municipal
employees are en important political force, as well. City managers will
require municipal employees to provide more hours of work than they
would in the employment of cities which lack managers. Mayors, who value
the electoral support of their subordinates, will not alter the standard
work year. City managers will offer compensation packages to their
employees which emphasize incentives for enhanced productivity --pen-
sion, medical and educational plans. Mayors will offer compensation
packages in which wages and paid time not worked --componentswhich
lend themselves to immediate consumption, and to the employee's im-
mediate gratification --arepredominant.
Municipal executive officials ensure their political success through
the maintenance of general satisfaction among the electorate. Municipal
legislative officials may achieve the same ends more efficiently through
the exploitation of differences between interest groups within the
-12electorate. Officials of both types must have their tenure confirmed
regularly by municipal voters, if they are to remain in office. However,
in contrast to independent mayors, city councillors can frequently win
elections on the strength of support from relatively narrow con-
stituencies.8
Furthermore, individual councillors are rarely threatened
with responsibility for the legislative performance of their entire
council. If councillors successfully promote the interests of those
constituencies to which they owe their elections, they may safely ignore
the attitudes of other city residents. In comparison to unitary execu-
tive officials, city councillors devote greater effort to obtaining
allocations of municipal services and municipal tax burdens which are
favorable to their particular constituencies, less effort to ensuring
efficient production and equitable assessment.
Most municipal reform advocates and contemporary political scientists
assert that city councillors are particularly susceptible to the in-
fluence of special interests, when their offices are won in partisan and
ward elections. They believe that this susceptibility should be reduced
under systems of nonpartisan and at-large elections (Lineberry/Fowler).
However, when electorates are segmented into special interests, sitting
and aspiring city councillors who wish to efficiently build and maintain
constituencies will inevitably seek to exploit these divisions (Beard).
If nonpartisan and at-large elections do not, of themselves, engender
The electorate for city couricillors elected from wards is, by
definition, a subset of the entire municipal electorate. Under most
systems of at-large balloting --systemsin which each citizen may
cast as many votes as there are council seats to be filled -- can-
didates can gain office through the loyalty of interest groups which
themselves do not constitute an electoral majority.
-13-consensus in the electorate, they will not discourage political appeals
to interest groups.
Perversely, nonpartisan and at-large elections encourage councillors
and councillor candidates to manipulate municipal policy for the benefit
of those interest groups whose support they value. Councillors cannot
rely upon electoral support from citizens with whom they share neighbor-
hood and political affiliations under these reforms as they can under
the traditional institutions these reforms replace. They must, there-
fore, rely more heavily on support won through the promise or provision
of preferential treatment. If anything, city councillors chosen in at-
large or nonpartisan elections will be more preoccupied with obtaining
distributions of which their supporters approve, and less interested in
efficiency, than will be those chosen in traditional elections. At-large
elections may be responsible for the greater part of these distortions;
the neighborhood affiliations they suppress are typically more impor—
tent, in local elections, than are the national party affiliations
disallowed under nonpartisanship.
City councillors elected under the auspices of reform institutions
will be particularly sensitive to the political context of municipal
labor practices. Municipal employees are often a powerful interest group
in their own right. In addition, municipal employment serves as
patronage rewards for loyal constituents. At-large and nonpartisan city
councillors will allocate more municipal resources to municipal
employees, and more municipal employment to other supporters, than will
ward and partisan councillors. Municipalities which have adopted legis-
-14-lative reforms will have larger work forces, and higher compensation
levels, than municipalities which have not. Compensation packages in
these municipalities will emphasize components whose value to the
employee is immediate and obvious; wages and paid time not worked.
The extent of institutional variation among American municipal
governments provides an unusual opportunity to explore the economic
effects of such variations. American municipalities also demonstrate
wide variations in the duration of their current institutions. This
variation provides an additional opportunity; to explore the economic
significance of institutional aging. The economic behavior of municipal
governments will change as they mature. Governments of recent vintage
will be especially productive, both because they have been chosen to
respond to contemporary demands, and because they may enjoy the 'Haw-
thorne effects' attributable to improvements in worker motivation
(Sayles). Institutions which were efficient in production of the serv-
ices required when they were first adopted will function less effec-
tively as service requirements evolve. They will require greater levels
of inputs than will newer iunicipal institutions in order to produce
similar service levels. Municipal employment levels should increase with
the duration of municipal institutions.
The characterization of municipal economic behavior presented here
predicts significant economic effects attributable to the form and age
of municipal government institutions. These predictions both extend arid
contradict those presented in preceding studies. Empirical tests in the
succeeding section confirm the wealth of implications to which this
-15-characterization gives rise
1ic.4p4 GovmatStructure, Eap1oyat!n4pJy Co.peiisat joe
In a large sample of American cities, different institutions of
municipal government demonstrate the differences in labor market be-
havior discussed in the preceding section.Neasures of manhours of
municipal employment per capita, municipal employment per capita, annual
work hours per municipal employee, total compensation expenditures per
hour worked, wage expenditures per hour worked, expenditures for paid
time not worked per hour worked, expenditures for medical benefits per
hour worked, expenditures for pension benefits per hour worked, and
expenditures for miscellaneous benefits per hour worked for police,
fire, sanitation and an aggregate of all other noneducational depart-
ments thoroughly describe labor market conditions in each of these
cities.. City managers, mayors chosen through direct election, city
councillors chosen through nonpartisan ballots, and councillors chosen
in at-large elections alter levels of these measures in consistent
response to the incentives and opportunities presented by the charac-
teristics of their offices. Employment levels increase with institu-
The sample analyzed here contains observations from 839 cities, in a
pooled cross-section time-series. Variables for each city are drawn
from surveys conducted by the International City ilanagement Associa—
tion, the Census of Governments and the Census of Population. The
Appendix describes the sample in greater detail, and provides
specifications of the regression equations reported here.
-16-tional maturity.
Executive officials who bear sole responsibility for the performance
of their municipalities exercise important influence over outcomes in
municipal labor markets. Both city managers and mayors chosen through
direct elections appear to hire more efficient, more highly skilled
employees. They significantly reduce municipal employment levels and
increase the levels and sophistication of employee compensation, in the
absence of controls for employee productivity. 10 The responsibilities
common to both offices are more important to the officials who hold
them, in the management of municipal labor relations, than are the
obvious differences in political context. However, mayors chosen through
direct elections are more sensitive to the electoral power of municipal
employees. If both offices coexist, officeholders may compete for
employees' allegiances.
Table 1 presents coefficients which indicate that city managers
reduce manhours of municipal service by more than 4000 and mayors chosen
through direct elections by nearly 3000 manhours per 10,000 capita.
These reductions are substantial, as well as significant; that as-
sociated with city managers represents and that associated with
10
Employee productivity cannot be captured by explicit measures,
because output cannot be measured satisfactorily and personal
characteristics of municipal employees are unknown.
The presence of city managers and the practice of direct mayoral
elections are represented by values of one, the absence of either by
values of zero for the respective dummy variables.
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mayorschosen through direct elections represents of average
levels.
12In addition, both offices increase total compensation for
municipal employees; city managers by $.42 per hour worked, and mayors
chosen through direct elections by $.28 .Again,both increases are
large; the effect of manager-s represents 5.4? of mean total compensa-
tion, that of mayors chosen through direct election represents
Both offices promote more sophisticated compensation packages by
12
The Appendix contains a table of average values and standard devia-
tions for the dependent variables.
-18-
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(5.21)distributing increases intotalcompensation disproportionately in favor
of nonwage compensation. City managers increase mean wage expenditures
by only 4.4k, but increase medical expenditures by 9.9?, pension expen-
ditures by 13.9k and expenditures on miscellaneous benefits by 28.4?.
Mayors chosen through direct elections increase wage expenditures by
only 3.6t, but increase expenditures on pay for time not worked by
and pension expenditures by 8.5?.
F-tests demonstrate the extent of similarity between the effects of
these two offices. Hypotheses of identical coefficients for the two
offices cannot be rejected in equations predicting manhours and
employees per 10,000 capita, total compensation, wage, and pension
expenditures per hour worked. These similarities are not universal.
Coefficients are different, with 5 confidence, in equations for annual
work hours per employee, expenditures for medical and miscellaneous
benefits. These differences demonstrate that mayors chosen through
direct elections, are reluctant to impose upon municipal employees the
full burden of improved efficiency.
Mayors chosen through direct elections reduce manhours solely through
reductions in employment of 5.3'. They do not significantly alter work
hours for the employees they retain. In contrast, city managers both
deny employment to many who would obtain it in their absence, and in-
crease work hours for those they employ. They reduce employment by
but require an additional 25 hours, or three days, of work per year.
Analogously, mayors chosen through direct elections offer compensa-
-19tion packages which, in comparison to those offered by city managers,
emphasize current payments rather than benefits which enhance career
productivity. They allocate a substantial portion of compensation in-
creases to increases in pay for time not worked. Nanagers prefer compen-
sation components which embody investments in human capital. They do not
increase pay for time not worked, increase medical benefits and greatly
increase miscellaneous benefits.
Twenty-six percent of cities in the United States (Sanders) and 48"
of the cities in the sample analyzed here include both offices among
their municipal institutions.
14Unfortunately, an interaction term
representing the joint presence of city managers arid mayors chosen
through direct elections is strongly collinear, in this data, with the
variables representing the individual presence of either. In conse-
quence, this sample can only offer suggestions as to the relationship
between the two offices.
This interaction term is significant at 1O' in the equation predict-
ing employment per capita, and at 5 in the equation predicting expendi-
tures on medical benefits, when added to the specifications presented
above. It is insignificant when added to the equations predicting all
Educational programs and uniform expenditures represent the bulk of
miscellaneous benefits. Coefficients in the equation for paid time
not worked are different at 12.
14
This sample, because it is based upon surveys conducted by the
International City Management Association, contains a higher propor-
tion of cities with managers than does the population of cities in
the United States. Refer to the Appendix for further description of
the sample.
-20-other employment and compensation levels. 15 For these characteristics
of municipal labor markets, this test does not reject the hypothesis
that effects of city managers and mayors chosen directly are simply
additive.
However, the interaction term provides only one test of the relation-
ship between mayors and managers. In its presence, the combined effects
of city managers and mayors chosen through direct elections are repre-
sented by its sum with the two individual coefficients. These combined
effects indicate that, in cities where they coincide, managers and
mayors may conflict so as to prevent either from improving the ef-
ficiency of municipal work forces. Municipal employees profit most
noticeably from the consequences of this conflict.
F-tests indicate that workforces in municipalities which have both
city managers arid mayors chosen through direct elections are not statis-
tically distinguishable from workforces in municipalities which have
neither, though those of municipalities with either alone would be
substantially smaller. Point estimates of these effects, and those on
annual work hours per employee, are numerically small, as well as insig-
nificant.
At the same time, F-tests re,ect the hypothesis that managers and
mayors have no )oint effect on expenditures for total compensation,
wages. medical and pension benefits at and on miscellaneous benefits
These equations are available from the author.
-21-at Point estimates of these combined effects imply that compenss-
tion levels increase under the )oint authority of managers and mayors by
far more than the sum of their li-idependent effects would suggest. In
municipalities with both, expenditures for total compensation per nour
worked exceed those in cities with neither by $1.22, or 16 of average
values. Expenditures on wages are increased by medical benefits by
50", pension benefits by 45 and miscellaneous benefits by
These results imply that, together, city managers and mayors chosen
through direct elections offer their employees unusual increases in
compensation, but do not require compensating reductions in employment.
When both offices are present, executive authority must unavoidably be
fragmented. Neither office may retain power sufficient to insist upon
efficient employment practices in confrontation with employee interests.
Further, managers and mayors may compete for effective control of execu-
tive powers. They may prefer the support of favored municipal employees
in this competition to the approval of constituents satisfied by reduc-
tions in municipal expenditures on labor services.
The results above demonstrate that both city managers and mayors
chosen through direct elections exercise powerful influence over
municipal economic activity. The conduct of municipal labor relations
most successfully enhances the political careers of officials in these
offices when its primary effect is to create and maintain efficient
municipal labor forces. Elected executives can obtain further benefits
by ensuring that, without excessive violence to the requirements of
efficiency, municipal employment and compensation policies appeal to
-22-municipal employees. Both managers and mayors may resort to these ap-
peals in municipalities where they must share executive authority.
Reform legislative institutions, as well as the executive reform of
city managers, exercise important influence over outcomes in municipal
labor markets. But city councillors elected under these reforms are more
likely to curry favor among their employees than to promote efficiency.
In contrast to their treatment under city managers, both municipal
employees and aspirants to municipal employment benefit unambiguously
from the conduct of at-large or nonpartisan city council elections.
Nunicipalities which have adopted either reform have larger workforces,
higher levels of compensation, and disproportionate shares of current
consumption in compensation packages.
The coefficients presented in Table 2 demonstrate the generosity of
reform city councillors. 16 Nonpartisan city council ballots increase
manhours of municipal service by nearly 3000 annual hours per 10,000
capita, or 5.5c of average levels. This increase is accomplished en-
tirely through an increase of in average municipal employment per
capita. Nonpartisanship increases expenditures for wages per hour by
largely through 12.3k reductions in expenditures for pension
benefits, and 9.8k reductions in those for miscellaneous benefits.
16
The conduct of nonpartisan city council ballots is represented by a
dummy variable whose value is one in cities which have adopted this
reform. At-large city councillora are represented by the fraction of
all city council seats contested in at-large elections. This vari-
able has a minimum value of zero, and a meximum value of one.
-23-Table 2.
OLS Coefficients for At-Large N22 !2!!
Practiceof Proportion of
Nonpartisan City Councillors
Manhours Per 10,000 2834. 2607.
Capita (2.11) (2.13)
Employees Per 10,000 1.53 1.69
Capita (2.11) (2.56)
Annual Work Hours Per 3.23 -13.4
Employee (.292) (1.33)
Total Compensation Per .0903 .227
Hour Worked (1.05) (2.89)
Pay for Time Worked Per .163 .166
Hour Worked (2.95) (3.31)
Pay for Time Not Worked .0296 .0678
Per Hour Worked (1.14) (2.85)
Medical Benefits Per .00205 -.0204
Hour Worked (.161) (1.75)
Pension Benefits Per -.0938 .00637
Hour Worked (3.37) (.250)
Miscellaneous Benefits -.0104 .00723
Per Hour Worked (1.99) (1.51)
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.
t —=====——= = = = —=========—— = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == =
At-largeelections match nonpartisan ballots in their employment
effects; city councils in which all members are elected at-large in-
crease per capita manhours of municipal service by and per capita
municipal workIorces by 6.1 over average levels in cities whose coun-
cillors are all elected from wards. These elections exceed nonpartisan
ballots in their effects upon municipal employee compensation. They
improve upon average levels of municipal employee total compensation by
That increase is devoted entirely to increases of in wages
and of 7•3 in pay for time not worked.
-24-These estimates offer weak evidence that the political support of
municipal employees is more valuable in the absence of neighborhood than
in the absence of national party affiliations. At-large councils in-
crease municipal employment to the same extent as do nonpartisan coun-
cils. They also increase total employee compensation, while nonpartisan
councils merely reallocate existing compensation levels in favor of
current consumption. However, these contrasts are not strong. Coeff i-
dents on at-large and on nonpartisan elections differ with 95 con-
fidence in only equations estimating levels of pension and miscellaneous
expenditures. Coefficients on total compensation differ with only 8O'
confidence.
Fifty-six percent of the cities in the sample under study here elect
all city councillors to at-large seats, and conduct nonpartisan ballots.
17
These cities limit moat severely the range of constituencies to which
city council candidates may appeal. Under these limitations, councillors
may compete for the favor of municipal employees with special vigor.
While the )oint effects of these two legislative reforms are, in some
cases, less than the sum of their individual effects, municipal employ-
ment and compensation levels are substantially higher in these
municipalities than in those with either reform, alone.
A dummy variable indicating the simultaneous conduct of nonpartisan
ballots and at-large city council elections is significant in equations
17
Sanders reports that 67' of cities in the United States elect all
councillors to at-large seats, and that 7O of cities conduct non-
partisan ballots. He does not report the proportion of cities with
both. The correlation between these reforms is probably positive.
-25-for expenditures on wages,medicaland pension benefits.
18
In all three
cases, the interaction term reduces the joint effects of the two
reforms, but does not cancel them. For example, the estimated effects of
nonpartisanship and at-large elections on wages are increased to $.32
and $.36 per hour worked, respectively, in this specification. Their
interaction reduces wages by $25 .Inequations estimating expenditures
for medical and pension benefits, the interaction mitigates significant
reductions which would be otherwise imposed.
Though the joint impact of both legislative reforms is less than the
sum of their individual effects for some components of compensation, F-
tests demonstrate that their joint effect is significantly different
from zero, at 5, for all dependent variables with the exceptions of
annual hours of work and expenditures on miscellaneous benefits. Point
estimates of these effects for manhours and employment per capita,
expenditures for total compensation and paid time not worked are nearly
identical to the sum of individual effects given in Table 2. Point
estimates of these effects for wages, medical and pension expenditures
demonstrate heightened emphasis on current consumption in compensation
packages. Together, nonpartisan ballots and at-large elections increase
wages by $43 per hour worked. Nearly half of that increase is achieved
through reductions of $.05 in medical and of $.13 in pension expendi-
tures.
The coefficients in Table 2 demonstrate that city councillors treat
18These equations are available from the author.
-26-municipal employees with exaggerated solicitousness under Municipal
legislative reforms. City councillors can gain and retain their offices
with the support of relatively small constituencies. Their offices do
not require them to take individual responsibility for council activity.
They are, therefore, eager to acquire the political support of city
employees when they cannot rely upon the support of their neighbors or
their fellow partisans. Equations which include an interaction term
demonstrate that this eagerness is compounded when neither constituency
is available.
The economic effects of municipal executive and legislative institu-
tions demonstrate that these institutions exercise influence over
economic activity, independently of the preferences associated with the
populations they serve. The influence of institutional age on employment
levels emphasizes the importance of institutional characteristics. 19
Levels of municipal employment and manhours of municipal service per
capita increase with increased duration of council-manager governments.
19
The age of municipal government institutions and the economic 'age'
of a city are distinct concepts. Institutional age is measured as
the difference between the year of observation and the year in which
the municipality adopted the mayor-council, council-manager, commis-
sion or town meeting form through which it is currently governed.
Economic 'age' cannot be defined with similar precision. Most of the
important aspects of this concept are captured by variables for one—
unit structures as a percentage of all dwelling units in 1970,
increases and decreases in population in both the decade 1960-70 and
the decade 1970-80, and dummy variables for geographic region in the
regression equations from which reported coefficients are drawn.
Simple correlations between the duration of government and all
thirteen 'age' variables are smaller than .17 in absolute value.
-27-==
Table3.






Employees Per 10,000 .0435
Capita (3.88)
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.
Council-manager and mayor-council governments 'age' differently. The
relationship between duration and form of government, as represented by
two variables interacting duration with presence and absence of city
managers, demonstrates that council-manager governments increase employ-
merit levels with duration, but mayor-council governments do not.
20
The coefficients presented in Table 3 demonstrate that council-
manager governments provide an additional 83 manhours of municipal
service per 10,000 capita with each additional year of government dura-
tion.
21This increase is entirely attributable to increases of .04 in
employment per 10,000 capita. These increases represent only .16" of
20The principle distinction between mayor-council and council-manager
forms of municipal government is given by the absence or presence of
the city manager's office.
21
Equations in which duration is interacted with type of government
are available from the author. In addition to the coefficients
reported in Table 3, these equations reveal that mayor-council
governments provide significantly fewer medical expenditures with
age.
-28-average manhour and employment levels. However, the mean duration of
council-manager governments in this sample is 31.7 years. These effects
imply that employment in new council-manager governments should be 5.1k
less than in municipalities of average duration. In contrast, employment
levels in cities with nayor-council governments do not change with
duration of government. Coefficients for their duration are small,
insignificant and significantly different from those for council-manager
governments in both equations.
The comparison between employment effects in council—manager and
mayor-council governments suggests that they are attributable to dif-
ferences in technology rather than to differences in employee motiva-
tion. City managers should be more aware of improvements in municipal
production techniques, and more committed to their implementation, than
would be political officials. Council-manager cities are likely to
acquire contemporary technology when they first establish the city
manager. Cities which have adopted that form more recently would acquire
more capital-intensive technology.
The empirical results presented in this section demonstrate that.
variations in institutions of municipal government yield predictable
variations in municipal labor market outcomes. The important variations
are in specific characteristics of legislative and executive offices.
Gross distinctions, such as that between reform and traditional
-29-structures, conceal more than they reveal.
22
In particular, specific
characteristics must be examined in order to demonstrate the two most
important principles of municipal political behavior: Officials who
share responsibility for the performance of their duties --citycoun-
cillors, or city managers and mayors chosen through direct election in
cities where both are present --aremore likely to promote the inter-
ests of supportive constituencies, such as municipal employees, than of
the entire community. When the range of constituencies open to municipal
politicians is restricted -- throughnonpartisanship and at-large elec-
tions --theypursue available constituencies, such as municipal
employees, with increased vigor.
III Cunclusiafi
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that institutions of
municipal government exercise important, systematic influence over
municipal economic behavior. City managers alter municipal production
techniques, employment and compensation practices in the service of
greater efficiency. Mayors chosen through direct elections serve many of
22
Institutional variation is shown to be important in equations which
replace all measures of government structure by a single dummy
variable representing the presence or absence of a reform govern-
ment, but estimated effects confound very different effects at-
tributable to different municipal offices. Reform governments in-
crease employment per capita by 3.9 of average levels, expenditures
on total compensation by 2.3?, on wages by on paid time not
worked by 4.8, and on miscellaneous benefits by 5.5? at 5' sig-
nificance levels. They increase manhours per capita by 3.6', at lO
significance.
-30-the same purposes, but do so with more respect for the comfort of
municipal employees. Nonpartisan and at-large city councils provide
favorable employment conditions to municipal employees in order to
secure their political support.
These results confirm the economists' intuition that city managers
are an important characteristic of American city government, but
demonstrate that other characteristics are equally powerful. They con-
firm the political scientists' intuition that city managers promote
reform ob)ectives, but demonstrate that legislative reforms subvert the
reform program. Most importantly, they confirm the basic premise of
earlier work; the economic behavior of municipal governments depends
upon the institutions of municipal government.
These results demonstrate that political concerns cannot be purged
from the conduct of municipal government through institutional reform.
They also demonstrate that efficiency is a more compelling virtue in
institutions which vest a single official with all responsibility.
Officials are more sensitive to political considerations when respon-
sibility is shared within their office, or with other offices. The




Themunicipallabor market measures analyzed here are drawn from three
identical surveys of municipal employment and compensation, conducted in
1975, 1977 end 1979 (Friend and Pike, Friend and Bencivenga, Friend and
Lufkin). These surveys report numbers of full-time employees, standard
work schedules, paid time not worked, and fifteen categories of compen-
sation expenditures for employees in police, fire, sanitation, and all
other noneducetional departments. Eight hundred and thirty nine cities
provide complete records for at least one function in one year.
The observations in this study consist of labor market outcomes in
one function, in one year These observations are pooled across the
three survey years, and across the four functions. The sample which
results contains 5472 function-years.
Several sources provide the variables which appear in this analysis.
X92}5 2Z (ICMA) reports government structure for
each of the cities in this sample. Censuses of Population and Housing,
1970 and 1980, publish characteristics of city residents and city hous-
ing stock. Data from these sources are specific to individual cities,
but do not vary over functions or years. Annual Surveys of Government
record the characteristics of municipal labor relations. Three of these
-32-measures are specific to each city in each year. Five are observed in
each function, in each of the three years.
Table 4.
Means and Standard Deviations of
2i P2
Standard
Labor Market Measure Mean Deviation
Manhours Per 10,000 Capita 51966. 49626.
Employees Per 10,000 Capita 27.5 27.3
Annual Work Hours Per Employee 1930. 326.
Total Compensation Per Hour Worked $7.75 3.18
Pay for Time Worked Per Hour Worked $5.56 2.03
Pay for Not Time Worked Per Hour Worked $.966 .744
Medical Benefits Per Hour Worked $.357 .362
Pension Benefits Per Hour Worked $.761 .791
Miscellaneous Benefits Per Hour Worked $.106 .145
The complete sample yields three dependent measures of municipal
employment levels, six dependent measures of municipal compensation
levels and 47 independent variables. The employment measures are man-
hours and employees per capita, and annual work hours per employee. By
definition, the first variable is the product of the second and the
third. The compensation measures are total compensation, wage payments,
payments for time not worked, expenditures on medical benefits, expendi-
tures on pension benefits, and expenditures on miscellaneous benefits
per hour worked. By definition, the five component measures sum to the
total. Table 4 presents mean values and standard deviations for all nine
dependent variables.
-33-Compensation i measured municipi expenditures rather than
employee income. This distinction is important with regard to nonwage
compensation components. In particular, the relationship between pension
expenditures and pension liabilities is not reported.
-34-arours of Eiovmerit E1oyees Per r,nu WorM Hours
:0,000Caoita
R—Square .5765 .5948 .3380
Degrees ofFreedom 5425 5425 5425
Mean Square Error 1051766192 305.3 71090
Per 10,000 Cacita Per Eiiüoyee
1— 2!f1ti12ftttflictic
Intercept 129467.610.5088 70.73813110.6575 1838. 72118.0746
1970 Population, in 1,000 9.4030352.90300.0055458873.1781 —0.015770—0.5922
1960—70 % Increase,population —4.899142—1.5029—0.00276868—1.5764 0.0234130.8136
1960—70% Decrease, population —233.967450—1.6053 —0.124890—1.5906 0.2231240.1862
1970—80% Increase, population 22.7969001.2319 0.0163781.6427 —0.151885—0.9983
1970—80% Decrease, population 77.5348510.6068 0.0464730.6751 —0.168217—0.1601
1969 % Families below poverty level 865.2841374.5442 0.4317024.2082 1.9995551.2773
1969 Medianfamily income,in$1,000 1645.882.6458 0.9026812.6934 —3.120373—0.6101
1970 Median value, own—oco, in $1,000 —68.961043—0.3567 —0.051674—0.4961 0.7934080.4991
1970 % Units in one—unitstructures -122.796521—2.2808 -0.062754—2.1635 —0.325063—0.7344
1970 % Black population 205.9047723.6839 0.1246764.1403 —8.706249—1.5369
1970 % Spanish population —212.608797—3.0887 —0.106803—2.8800 —0.036455—0.0544
1970 % Population (18 years of age 44.6563560.3451 —0.021032—0.3017 2.8474022.6762
1970 % Population )E5 years of age 783.0260713.9727 0.4122213.8819 2. 124986 1.3113
1970 Median year of school 59.7176780.0612 0.1538540.2925 —9.536639—1.1879
1970 Male operative medearnings$1,000 —3199.02—4.5571 —1.534331—4.0570 —9.144400-1.5845
1970 Nonworker/workerratio —10780.8—3.5877 —5.380695—3.3236 —28.324422—1. 1465
1970 %Persons }23 with )3years h.s. —77. 157269—0. 7306 —0. 049170—0. 8642 1.059590 1.2204
1980 Medianage 20.0340560.1116 —0.012445—0.1287 —0.136138—0.0923
1970 % in White collaroccupations -53.771619—0.5910 —0.022608—0.4612 —0.465785-0.6227
1970 % Foreign stock —131.943942—1.6926 —0.053234—1.2676 —1.316737—2.0546
Middle atlantic division —7244.19—2.5618 —4.764646—3.1275 45.5769591.9605
East northcentral division —2734.82—1.0453 —3.821185—2.7110 155.7713747.2421
West north central division —2387.39—0.8688 —3.382647—2.2849 132.2488345.8539
South atlantic division 9194.3853.0074 2.6716931.6220 131.1123655.2163
East south central division 239.8776420.0670 —1.739526—0.9017 87.9723142.9884
West south centraldivision 2326.3320.7383 -0.466201—0.2748 89.8515963.4713
Mountain division 7947. 3072.3768 2.6549281. 4738 108. 6435003.9520
Pacific coast division —2898.31—1.0459 —3.996560—2.6769i5i.4748i66.6486
Presence of city manager —4094.96—2. 7731 —2.406421—3.0248 25.0561722.0639
Partisanship on election ballot 2834.463 2. 1107 1.5255162.1086 3.2252380.2921
% of Councilmen elected at—large 2607.3662.1260 1.6928112.5619 —13.434868—1.3324
Duration of government fore 57.5754873.4461 0.0308263.4246 0.2161941.5739
Mayor chosen through direct elections —2965.22—2.6570 —1.470797—2.4462 —7.604803-0.8289
Percent organized 11.2486020.65050.0041929910.4501 —0.098763—0.6947
Presence of bargaining units —3604.51—2.0081 —1.322838—1.3679 —40.096439—2.7171
Number ofbargaining units 4041.1999.23% 2.3278519.8788 3.3408760.9291
Labor relations policy, noberg. units —3815.81—2.4319 —1.738757—2.0569 —26.317034—2.0401
Presence of supervisors inbarg.units —39.370508—0.0286 —0.0818%—0.1105 7.0389770.6224
Number ofcontracts in effect 206. 1536950.7554 0.0592160.4708 —0.785192—0.3500
Number of memorandaofunderstanding 39.0601350. 1428 0.0384360.2607 —3.256635-1. 4477
% Employees covered by contracts 22.8540540.7897 0.0137320.8807 0.0731280.3073
Police department —70101—54.8441 —38.509457—55.9218 17.8306371.5368
Fire department -71046.5-51.6519 —42.442561—57.2734 419.99504737. 1400
Sanitation department -87949.6—55.9273 —47.958034—56.6057 7.6873100.5346
Observation from 1975 —4877.76—4. 3790 —2.918204—4. 8627 28.5480903. 1173
Observation from1977 -3444.65—3.2398 —1.870561—3.2655 1.8339690.2098Total Compersation
Per Hour Workec
Pay For TimeWorkedPay For Time Not
Per Hour Worked WorkedPer HourWorked
.5745 .5741 .2903
Decrees ofreecom 5425 5425 5425
ear Square Error 4.33 1.77 .396
1— T—
1nde2ent arabie CoefficientstatisticCoefficientstatisticCoefficientstatistic
Intercept 3.7467614.7375 2.9229125.7808 0.5332892.2306
1970 Population,in1,000 0.00064384383.09640.0006926665.21060.00014557482.3160
1960—70 % Increase, population 0.00010226180.4887-0. 000033939—0. 25373. 49465e—080.0006
1960—70% Decrease,population 0.0111511.1919 0.0100621.68220.0045121211.5954
1970—80 X increase, population —0.00136039—1.1451—0.00042373—0.5579—.0000138285—0.0385
1970—80 % Decrease,population —0.036704—4.4749 —0.020463—3. 9023—0.00607295—2.4492
1969 % amiiies below poverty level —0.029859—2.4427 -0.016693—2.1360-0.00630241—1.7056
1969 Macianfamily income, in 41,000 0.0285200.7142 0.0109220.4278 0.0181141.5005
1970 Median value,own—occ, in 41.000 0.0438873.5358 0.0234782.9587—0.000721502—0.1923
1970 % Unitsinone—unit structures 0.0013847170.4007 —0.0023046-1.0430—0.000455533—0.4360
1970% Black population 0.0157614.39270.0095593124.16730.0036329183.3494
1970 % Spanisi population 0.0104282.35990.0039228181.38860.0026770022.0041
1970 % Population (18 years of ace —0.022600—2.7203—0.00401032-0.7551 —0.013883—5.5281
1970 % Population >65 years of ace 0.0044177090.34910.0030216730.3735 —0.010646—2.7833
1970 Median year of school 0.007867950. 1255 —0.0121280.3026 0.0179210.9458
970 Maleonerativemed earnincs 41,000 0.3375537.4906 0.2337498.1134 0.0504693. 7048
1970 Nonworker/worker ratio —0.485048—2.5145 —0.335288—2.7187 0.0205120.3517
1970% Persons >23 witn >3 years h.s. 0.00090562950.13360.0041482510.9571-0.00289824-1.4142
1980 Median ace -0.00955971—0.8298-0.00533102—0.7238—0.000846415—0.2431
1970 % in White collar occupations —0.010094—1.7282-0.00365933—0.9800—0.000727036—0.4118
1970 % Foreipn stock 0.0328786.5700 0.0199086.22270.0051081573.3767
Middle atlantic division 0.8351914.6009 0.3325782.8657 0.005009430.0913
East north central division 1.3341247.9436 0.6458106.0146 0.0498590.9820
West north central division 0. 813837 4. 6136 0. 2878772. 5526 0.0377230. 7074
South atlantic division 0.4804802.4482 0. 198921 1.5854 0.0296070.4990
East south central division 0.2033070. 8845 —0.140806—0.9582 0.059577 0. 8574
West south central division 0.3715721.8385 0.0286820.2220 0.0718141.1754
Mountain division 1.5307617. 1313 0.6523404.7536 0.3123684.8139
Pacific coast ivision 2.13768512.0165 1.24112210.9126 0, 1701063. 1631
Presence of citymanacer 0.416918 4.3981 0.2440554.02700.0019602950.0684
Partisanship onelection ballot 0.090269 1.0471 0.1628452.9547 0.0296461. 1376
% of Councilmen elected at—large 0.227366 2. 8879 0.1663783.3054 0. 0678082. 8491
Duration of government form -0.00105884—0.98720.00021790590.3178—0.000328067—1.0118
Mayor chosen tnrough direct elections 0. 2799353.9074 0.1739733. 7984 0. 0491652. 2702
Percent oraani:ed 0.0043190323.89090.0024957543.51680.00086760732.5856
Presence of bargainin units 0.5644434.8985 0.2234203.0328 0.1851015.3140
Number of baraining units 0. 0021948150. 0782 0.0185651.0342—0.00438992—0.5172
Labor relationspolicy,no barfl. units 0.2888822.8580 0.1194821.8554 0.1105013.6291
0resence of suoervisors in bar. units —0.00302504—0.03430.0081484570.1443—0.00554533—0.2077
Number of contracts in effect 0.0658303.7577 0.0375433.3521—0.00163778—0.3093
umber ofmemoranda of understandino 0.0192621.09660. 0014222310.12670.0044803320. 8438
N Employees covered bycontracts —0.00156747—0.84370.00043014230.3621.000049752630.0886
Police department 2. 15978625. 3218 1.39308826.5562 0.2084788.4049
ire department 0.5840206.6141 —0.301842—5.3469 0.62704223.4912
Sanitation department —0.110352—1.0931 —0.225140—3.4884 0.0279730.9166
Observation from 1975 —2.936660—41.0681 —1.667067—36.4658 —0.367767—17.0134
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1960—70% Increase,population
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0. 0023381733.1553 0. 0045388922.80440.00038399313.2252
0.0778232.8951 0.422490 7. 1962—0.00270925—0.2448
0. 081023 3. 2578 0.55072610.13880.0067045840.6548
0.0518241.9839 0.4404947.7209—0.00408024—0.3794
-0.051501—1.7721 0.3063724.8266—0.00291948—0.2440
-0.0058672-0.1724 0.299835 4. 0332-0.00943216-0.6730
—0.025345—0.8468 0.308731 4.7231 —0.012309—0.9989
0.0827552.6035 0.4737496.82410.0095491450.7297
0.1543965.8509 0.5606479.7444 0.011414 i.0524













0.0737226.2320 0.33317512. 5548 0.14932329.8489
0.0123710, 9461 0.1775626.2176 0.06888612.7958
0.0699844.6815-0.00709134—0.2172 0.0339223.8867
—0. 297045—28.0525 —0.560596—24.2399 —0.044186—10. 1353
—0.220206—21.7874 —0.414261—18.7664 —0.037562—9.0265References
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